In spite of the recent theoretical literature on the cross effects between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) such as the "domino effect" and "competitive liberalization" theory, little has been done to investigate how these effects impact on bilateral trade flows. In this paper we study two cross PTA effects: how pre-existing PTAs will dilute (shield) the trade creation (diversion) effect of new PTAs. We develop a theoretical foundation of cross PTA effects and find strong empirical evidence of both the dilution and shielding effects from various models that control for biases due to unobserved omitted variables, sample selection and firm heterogeneity. It is found that, although the dilution effect is sizable, the net trade creation effect remain substantial and positive, while both the shielding and net trade diversion effects are small. As a result, the positive inter-bloc trade effect of PTAs dominates the negative extra-bloc trade effect. These findings do not support the recent theoretical studies which explain the recent surge of PTAs on the ground that they could be used as a defensive device against trade diversion.
1 Introduction (2011) .
Our empirical models are based on the most commonly used gravity equation framework. The recent literature, however, identifies several biases in the traditional estimates of the gravity equation. Following that, in our estimations we account for unobserved country-pair heterogeneity using country-pair fixed effects (CPFEs) Magee (2003) ; Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) ; Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and multilateral resistance terms by adding country-time fixed effects (CTFEs) Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) ; Subramanian and Wei (2007) ; Magee (2008) ; ?. Our empirical estimates of log liner models show that a rise in intra-bloc trade with PTA decreases dramatically from 328% to 68 % with CPFEs, and further down to 34% with CTFEs in addition. These results highlight the importance of accounting for both country-pair and country-time unobserved heterogeneity in the gravity model.
When CTFEs are included, however, it is not possible to identify both the trade creation and diversion effects due to perfect multicollinearity; as such, previous studies tend to omit trade diversion when controlling for CTFEs (e.g. Magee (2008) ; ?). We propose two new methods to address this problem. One is that we allow CTFEs to vary for every two/three year, not every year. The other is that we apply the correlated random effect (CRE) approach as in Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlak (1978) .
Given the large number of zero observations in trade flow data, self-selection of trade and the extensive margin can be another source of bias (Helpman et al., 2008) . Besides the log linear models, we use the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure to control for self-selection and the Helpman et al. (2008) procedure to control for the extensive margin.
Lastly, Tenreyro (2006, 2011) argue that the OLS (Ordinary Least Square) estimator in log linearized models suffers from severe bias caused by heteroskedastic errors, and suggest to use Poisson Pseudo-Maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator instead. However, the PPML estimator does not control for CPFEs, which is crucial in avoiding bias in estimating the PTAs effects. For instance, in our estimations of the trade diversion effect, the OLS estimator overstates it by 180 percentage points and the PPML estimator by 120 percentage points. We address this problem by applying the Conditional Poisson Pseudo-Maximum likelihood (CPPML) estimator suggested by Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011) , which can control for both CPFEs and CTFEs.
Once we control for both CPFEs and CTFEs, we reach the same qualitative conclusion for all the model specifications and estimation methods considered in this paper. First, the dilution effect is both statistically and economically significant. For instance, the formation of a PTA increases intra-bloc trade volume by 34% with the first PTA, but moderating to 18% after incorporating the dilution effect in the log-linear model. Second, the shielding effect is significant statistically, but not so economically due to the trade diversion effect itself being very small in absolute terms. Extra-bloc trade flows decrease by 0.7% with the first PTA and by 0.6% after incorporating the shielding effect in the log-linear model. Our findings therefore cast doubt on the idea of using a PTA as a defensive device to mitigate any adverse effects of other PTAs. In other words, in contemplating a PTA, the primary consideration should remain the gain from trade creation even at the presence of the dilution effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrate the idea of the trade dilution and shielding effects. In section 3, we develop the theoretical foundation using a three-country model. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology. Section 5 describes data set to be used. 
The trade dilution and shielding effects
We illustrate the idea of the dilution and shielding effects in Figure 1 . First, Panels (a), (b) , and (d) show the trade dilution effect. Panels (a) and (b) indicate that i s imports from j change from 100 units to 175 units, implying 75% change increase with a PTA. However, if i and k have already had a PTA in place before, as Panels (a) and (d) show, i 's imports from j increase only 50% (from 100 units to 150 units). i 's imports from j increase less by 25 percentage points due to the existing PTA between i and k. We call this the trade trade dilution. As shown in a theoretical model in Section 3, the trade dilution arises as j 's firm cannot enjoy the cost advantage over k's firm in i 's market if i and k have already formed a PTA. Next, Panels (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the trade shielding effect. Panels (a) and (c) indicate that i s imports from j change from 100 units to 75 units, implying 25% change decrease with PTA between i and k. However, if i and j have already had a PTA in place before, as Panels (b) and (d) show, i 's imports from j decrease only 14% (from 175 units to 150 units) with PTA between i and k. i 's imports from j decrease less by 11 percentage points due to the existing PTA between i and j . We call this the trade shielding. The trade shielding arises because j 's firm is less affected by losing the cost advantage in i 's market as i was importing larger quantity due to its pre-existing PTA with j compared to no PTA between i and j .
The model
In this section,we construct a three-country model to examine how a country's imports from a PTA member country and the third country depend on the presence of existing PTA, and obtain the dilution and shielding effect in order to infer the sign of the trade creation and trade diver-sion effects of the following PTAs. First, we define the trade creation and trade diversion. Then, we examine how existing PTAs affect the trade creation and trade diversion.
Trade creation and trade diversion
Following Brander and Krugman (1983) and Krishna (1998), we consider three countries, labeled x, y, and z. The numeraire good and a homogeneous good, q, are produced with constant return to scales by each country i , i = x, y, z. There is one firm producing the homogeneous good in each country and competing in a Cournot fashion in the segmented markets. The firm in country i faces the marginal cost of c i , which is independent of output level. Fixed costs, for simplicity, are ignored. The demand for the product by the consumers in country i is P i = A i − Q i , where P i is the market price and Q i is the demand. Denote the supply of the product by a firm in country i to the market in j by q is the profit from market j :
where
The firm chooses the outputs, q j i
, to maximize its profit, taking the tariff rate and the outputs of all other firms as given.
The Nash equilibrium supply by a firm in country i to country j is given by:
where k = x, y, z. We further assume that initially, all countries impose the same non-discriminatory MFN tariff, t j i = t i > 0 for i = j , and forming PTA between i and j implies t j i = 0. Thus, for example, x's imports from y in the absence of any PTA of x is
We assume the initial imports from i from j is positive: that is
x's imports from y in the presence of PTA between x and y is
From (2) and (4), we can obtain the percentage change in x's imports from y with PTA between x and y, which is defined as trade creation effect in this paper:
where x y q z x refers to x' imports from y in the presence of PTA between x and y. The positive sign of x y T C means that x's imports from y increases with PTA between them.
Next, we calculate the trade diversion effect, which is defined as the percentage change in x's imports from z with PTA between x and y:
The positive sign of x y T C means that x's imports from z increases with PTA between x and y.
Trade dilution effect
Now we examine how a country's imports from a PTA member depend on the presence of existing PTA of the member country. We define the trade dilution effect of PTA as the difference of the percentage change in imports from the member country for for the PTA given PTA with other country and the PTA with no PTA with other country.
Thus, the trade dilution effect of PTA between x and y due to PTA between x and z can be written as
where "x y|xz" represents the situation in which PTA between x and y is formed in the presence of PTA between x and z.
From ( 
Plugging (3), (5), and (8) into (7) yields
The negative sign of the trade dilution indicates that x's imports from y increase less in the presence of PTA with the third country.
Intuitions are as follows: from (5), x increases its imports from y by
percentage point more as it forms the first PTA with y. These increases which arise due to an elimination of t y x = t x can be decomposed into three parts. The first t x A x −3c y +c x +c z −2t x percentage point comes from newly created market as prices in x decreases. Another t x A x −3c y +c x +c z −2t x percentage point is taken over from x's initial share to y due to the y's relative costs reduction compared to x's costs. These two components are net trade creation. The last
percentage point is attributed to trade diverted from z due to y's relative costs reduction compared to z's costs. 3 The effect from the fist two factors remain in the presence of PTA between x 3 All these changes can be easily shown by comparing the initial market share of each country in x and market share after PTA between x and y. 
Trade shielding effect
Now we examine how a country's imports from a non-member depend on the presence of existing PTA with that country. We define the shielding effect as the difference of the percentage change in imports from the non-member country for the PTA given PTA with non-member country and for the PTA without PTA with non-member country . Thus, the trade shielding effect of PTA between x and z due to the existing PTA between x and z can be written as
Both the term in the first parenthesis and the term in the second parenthesis are negative as x's imports from z decrease as x forms a PTA with y.
Given the condition of x y|xz q x z > 0,we can easily obtain T SD from (2):
The positive sign of the trade dilution indicates that x's imports from z decreases less due to x y P T A if it has already formed PTA with z. Trade shielding arises because z's firm is less affected by losing the cost advantage in x's market as x was importing greater quantity due to its pre-existing PTA with z compared to no PTA between x and z.
(11) gives us the following proposition. 
Econometric framework

Traditional gravity equation
The most commonly used framework to examine the trade volume effects of PTAs is the gravity equation:
where T i j t is the import by country i from country j at time t ; P T A i j t is a dummy taking a value of one if i and j are part of at least one PTA at time t and zero otherwise 4 ; T D i j t = k = j P T A i kt is the conventional trade diversion measure, constructed as the number of PTAs country i has signed with some third country k = j at time t ; Y is real GDP measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms; X is a vector of other determinants, such as distance, common language, GATT/WTO membership etc; µ t represents any unobserved global trend in trade and aggregate shocks in each year; ω i j is the unobserved country-pair heterogeneity that affects the likelihood of PTA, such as cultural, historical or political ties; and i j t is the error term. In general, the literature suggests γ 1 , which indicates the change in intra-bloc trade, to be positive while γ 2 , which represents the change in extra-bloc trade, to be negative.
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Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that omission of the multilateral trade resistance terms, in which trade barriers have a larger impact on relatively small countries, could lead to bias estimations. They suggest to employ importer-year and exporter-year FEs to allow for such time varying country heterogeneity. However, at the presence of CTFEs, it is impossible to identify the trade creation and diversion effects simultaneously due to perfect multicollinearity. This is because, P T A i j t plus T D i j t is equal to the total number of PTA membership country i has at time t , which is perfectly correlated to the importer-time FEs. However, when we quantify the cross PTA effects 6 over time, it is essential to include both P T A i j t and T D i j t to avoid omitted variable bias. To overcome this problem, we propose to introduce two-year CTFEs instead:
where u i t and v j t are respectively the importer-time and exporter-time FEs, and they are allowed to vary for every two years, i.e. u i t = u i ,t +1 and v j t = v j ,t +1 for t = 1, 3, 5.... 7 We argue that this treatment is sufficient because the multilateral trade resistance terms, being a function of prices, are unlikely to fluctuate much on an annual basis. This specification will allow us to identify both the trade creation and diversion effects as long as there are sufficient changes of P T A i j t and T D i j t within the two-year window. We will show in the empirical section that the results are not sensitive to the use of CTFEs of different durations.
As an alternative to treating CTFEs in (13) as dummy variables, we also directly model them using the CRE approach in Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlak (1978): 4 If the two countries are part of more than one PTA at time t , we only count it as one because extra PTA is redundant as far as the same two countries are concerned.
5 Kowalczyk (2000) points out that a member country may increase the volume of trade with a non-member country due to income effect, or the complementarity of goods traded between members and non-members. 6 We use the terms cross PTA effect and interactive effect between PTAs interchangably. 7 Since CTFEs vary only every two years, the variable for the time FEs, µ t , does not drop out.
, and a i t and b i t are error terms. That is, we model u i t by averaging each covariate that varies in all three dimensions (i × j × t ) across all partner countries j , and likewise model v j t by averaging each covariate across all countries i .
In addition to X i j t in the original trade volume regression, we also include l n( trade deficit i j t
l n(I ncome i t · I ncome j t ) and P T A i j t to control for CTFEs. These averaged variables W i t and W j t are then used as separate regressors in the model:
The CRE method makes use of the assumption that, once we have controled for CTFEs with W i t and W j t , a i t and b j t are uncorrelated with any covariates in (15) and thus do not cause any endogeneity problems.
Data
We Table (PWT) 7 .0, and data on GDP deflator are drawn from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis. PTA data are constructed from Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and data on GATT/WTO membership are also drawn from the WTO website. Data on distance, common language, common colony, common legal origin and adjacency are from CEPII.
There are three types of PTAs: customs union (CU), free trade agreement (FTA), and partial scope agreements (PSA), and the first two of which form our measure of PTA.
10 Table 1 reports the summary statistics of a number of covariates commonly seen in the gravity equation and a few others specific to the current study. Share borders, common language, common colony, and common legal origins are dummies variables. Among the 340,629 (time-specific) country-pairs with positive bilateral trade, 31,703 pairs or 9.3% have at least one PTA. There are substantial differences in the mean and standard deviation of the covariates between country-pairs with and without PTAs. This suggests the formation of PTA may be closely related to country and country-pair specific characteristics. Figure 6 in appendix depicts the time trend of the PTA 8 When trade deficit is negative, −l n(
−t r ad ed e f i ci t i j t GDP i t ·GDP j t
) is used instead to preserve the sign. 9 Note that as we use the unidirectional bilateral import data, each country-pair appears twice a year. 10 We exclude PSA because the agreements by PSA cover only the part of products unlike CU and FTA. Currently, 35 PSAs come into force which is around 7% of the total PTAs. membership. Since the early 1990s, the number of country-pairs with PTAs increases dramatically, almost doubling in the last 25 years. 
Results
We first estimate the model using OLS. Since there are a large number of zero observations for bilateral trade, we deploy a standard practice of using l n(T i j t +1) as the dependent variable, e.g. as in Liu (2009) and Roy (2011) . 11 Estimated results are reported in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 7 . T D i j t is not added in the first four columns. Each column is different in terms of FEs and, correspondingly, other control variables. The estimated coefficients of both P T A i j t and T D i j t are statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimations. With time fixed effects (TFEs) only, as shown in column (1), a PTA is estimated to increase trade between member countries by 218% (e 1.158 =3.18). The impact of a PTA on bilateral intra-bloc trade flows, however, decreases substantially to 49% in column (2) when CPFEs are included. This implies that unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity (e.g. historical, cultural or political ties) that correlates with both the the formation of a PTA and bilateral trade flows tends to bias the PTA coefficient upward. We further add CTFEs in columns (3) and (4). The difference between the two is that, CTFEs are allowed to vary every year in column (3) but only every two years in column (4). The coefficients on PTA are very similar (49% and 48% increase respectively in bilateral trade flows). This implies that two-year CTFEs sufficiently capture most of the multilateral trade resistance and country-specific aggregate shocks. 11 We include a dummy for the zero observations in all the linear regressions. In columns (5) to (8) we add T D i j t to the model. The estimated coefficient of PTA with TFEs only in column (5) is not much different from that in column (1). T D i j t is significant statistically, but not economically in that a PTA decreases trade flows between a member and a nonmember by only 0.4%. Inclusion of CPFEs in column (6) sees the impact of intra-bloc bilateral trade flows falling by more than two third (from 261% to 71%) while the trade diversion effect is still negligible (0.6%). In column (7), when both CPFEs and two-year CTFEs are added, the trade creation effect of a PTA declines further to 48%, and the trade diversion effect decreases to 0.3%. To examine if our specification to account for multilateral trade resistance is reliable, we reestimate the model using three-year CTFEs in column (8) and the Chamberlain-Mundlak method in column (9). In both cases quantitative and qualitative results remain the same as in column (7). 
Linear regression
To measure the cross PTA effects over time, we modify equation (13) into:
The term P T A i j t ×T D i j ,t −1 captures the dilution effects of pre-existing PTAs of i on the trade creation effects of a new PTA between i and j , while T D i j t × P T A i j ,t −1 captures the shielding effects of a pre-existing PTA between i and j on the trade diversion effects of new PTAs between i and some third countries. Here γ 1 is a measure of the trade creation effect of the first PTA (i.e. when T D i j ,t −1 = 0), γ 3 T D i j ,t −1 the dilution effect and γ 1 + γ 3 T D i j ,t −1 the net trade creation effect. Likewise, γ 2 is a measure of the trade diversion effect of the first PTA, γ 4 P T A i j ,t −1 the shield effect and γ 2 + γ 4 P T A i j ,t −1 the net trade diversion effect. Here we expect γ 3 < 0 and γ 4 > 0. If the shielding effect is sufficiently large, one may observe zero net trade diversion effect. Since previous studies do not account for the shielding effect, what they measure is the net trade diversion effect, and that may be the reason why the typical finding of it is very small and sometime no even significantly different from zero. In other words, to the extent that the dilution and shielding effects are significant, neglecting them in the gravity model will give rise to omitted variable bias. Table 3 presents the estimation results and Figure 3 shows the size of the various effects evaluated at the mean values of the variables. For the convenience of comparison, the odd numbered columns are duplications of the last five columns in Table 2 and the even numbered columns add the cross PTA terms. Again, each pair of columns are different in terms of the FEs and corresponding additional controls.
With the cross PTA terms, the estimated coefficient of PTA in the first row represents the change in imports for the members that do not have any pre-existing PTA, that is, the trade creation effect of the first PTA. In column (2) with TFEs only, the trade between members increases by 328%, which is 67 percentage points larger than the estimated impact in column (1). Controlling for CPFEs again reduces such impacts substantially. The first PTA creates intra-bloc trade by 68% in column (4), as compared to 71% in column (3). As we further add CTFEs, change in intra-bloc trade due to a country's first PTA decreases even further to 34% as shown in columns (6) and (8), while it slightly increases to 52% in column (10) as compared to 46% in column (9) when the Chamberlain-Mundlak method is used to control for CTFEs.
In even numbered columns, the coefficient of T D i j t indicates the change in trade flows between countries i and j due to the formation a PTA between country i and some third countries when i and j do not have a PTA. With TFEs only, a PTA is estimated to increase imports from non-member countries by 0.1% as shown in columns (2), in contrast to the trade diversion hypothesis. 12 The positive sign for T D i j t , however, is reversed back to negative in column (4) in line with the previous literature, once we control for the endogeneity of PTA with CPFEs. A PTA is now estimated to reduce extra-bloc trade by about 0.7%. The estimated coefficients of T D i j t remain negative and the impact turns out to be -0.7% and -0.3% with the additional CTFEs in columns (6) and (8) respectively, and -0.4% in column (10). The coefficient of P T A t × T D t −1 represents the additional change in intra-bloc trade flows for a new PTA due to pre-existing PTAs. For every estimation, the coefficient is statistically significant and yields a negative sign as expected. This implies that late coming PTAs for a country would not increase intra-bloc trade flows as much as its first PTA, confirming the existence of the dilution effect. Although the coefficient of P T A t × T D t −1 seems to be small, its effect on trade flows can be large as it is conditional on the value of T D t −1 , which can be large. As indicated in equation (16), at the presence of the dilution effect, the net effect of a PTA is given by γ 1 + γ 3 T D i j ,t −1 . Accordingly, in column (2), pre-existing PTAs dilute the trade creation effect of a new PTA by about slightly less than a half, from 328% to 147% (e 1.455+(−.042)13.16 =2.47, where 13.16 is the mean of T D). Comparing this with the 261% estimate in column (1), this implies that ignoring the interactive effects of PTAs will greatly exaggerate the intra-bloc trade flow effects. When we add CPFEs in column (4), the net PTA effect decreases to 33%, which is 35 percentage points less than the case without the interactive terms. Further adding CTFEs in columns (6), (8) and (10) shows that in net terms a PTA is estimated to increase the bilateral trade by 18%, 17% and 23% respectively, about 16, 17, and 29 percentage points lower than the corresponding static estimates.
Likewise, the coefficient of T D t × P T A t −1 represents the additional change in extra-bloc trade flows for a new PTA due to pre-existing PTAs. In all estimations, the term is positive as expected and statistically significant. This implies that late coming PTAs for a country would not reduce extra-bloc trade flows as much as its first PTA, confirming the existence of the shielding effect. The net trade diversion effect is calculated as γ 2 + γ 4 P T A i j ,t −1 . In column (2), with TFEs only, average extra-bloc trade is estimated to increase by 0.4% (e .001+(.034).093 =1.004, where .093
is the mean of P T A). Controlling for CPFEs in column (4), the trade flows between a member and non-member are estimated to fall by 0.5%, compared to 0.6% if we do not include the interaction term in column (3). The coefficient of T D in the second row of column (4) now represents the trade diversion effect of the first PTA for a country, which suggests a reduction of extra-bloc trade flows by 0.7%. This means that trade is 0.1 percentage point less diverted if a country has been previously engaged in other PTAs. In columns (6), (8) and (10) with CPFEs and CTFEs, average PTA is estimated to decrease the bilateral trade between a member and non-member by 0.6%, 0.2% and 0.3% respectively. In sum, omitting either CPFEs or CTFEs severely biases the trade creation and diversion effects. For the estimates with all the fixed effects, the trade creation effect of the first PTA is 34% and the trade creation effect with the dilution effect is 16%. This implies that the dilution effect reduces trade creation by as many as 18 percentage points. On the contrary, both the trade diversion and shielding effects are economically negligible albeit statistically significant. 
Heckman's two-stage estimation: Accounting for self-selection and the extensive margin of trade
In previous sections, we use l n(T i j t + 1) as our dependent variable to include zero bilateral trade observations. However, this is an arbitrary way of treating zero values in the dependent variable. In this section, we apply a generalized gravity equation that accounts for both selfselection and the extensive margin changes due to firm heterogeneity following the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure to control for self-selection and the Helpman et al. (2008) procedure to control for the extensive margin.
Two-stage estimation model
We obtain Heckman (1979) correction for self-selection of trade by estimating the following probit model:
where the dependent latent variable T * i j t
is equal to zero if T i j t = 0 and one if T i j ,t > 0, M i j t is a vector of all observed variables, and is a vector of excluded variables in the bilateral trade flows equation.
The exclusion restrictions require variables in Z i j t to be statistically significant in determining whether two countries trade each other, but not statistically significant in determining their trade flows if they trade. Based upon availability of data, our potential exclusion restriction variables include religion as in Helpman et al. (2008) 13 , costs in relation to infrastructure (Magee and Massoud, 2011) 14 , and annual event count of riots and violent demonstrations (Magee and Massoud, 2011) In the second stage, the trade flows equation to be estimated is given by:
where I M R is the inverse mills ratio (IMR) obtained from (17), andP R is the predicted probablity of bilateral trade corrected for the extensive margin following Helpman et al. (2008) . Thus, in equation (18), bias due to self-selection of positive trade is controlled by I M R i j t and bias due to the factors that affect both PTAs and the firm level extensive margin is controlled for by Φ −1 (P R i j ,t ). Table 4 and Figure 4 report the results of two-stage estimations where waterways are used for the excluded variable. 19 All the coefficients are statistically significant. The first three columns replicate the bias decomposition in Helpman et al. (2008) using the CRE approach to control for time varying unobserved heterogeneity, the next three columns control for CPFEs, and the last three columns control for both. Columns (1), (4), and (7) report the benchmark regression estimations. Columns (2), (5) and (8) show simple linear correction for unobserved factors that affect the extensive margin of trade by adding Φ −1 (Î M R i j ,t ) as an additional regressor. In columns (3), (6) and (9), we account for sample selection using Heckman (1979) procedure. A comparison of the first three columns shows how the ignorance of firm heterogeneity and sample selection biases the estimated coefficients when CPFEs are not added. As shown in column (1), a country's first PTA is estimated to increase its trade flows with members by 123% and to increase them with non-members by 0.8%. If we incorporate the dilution and shielding effects, intra-bloc trade effect of PTA is 68% and extra-bloc trade volume effect is 0.9 % . As we correct bias arising from firm heterogeneity in column (2), all the estimated coefficients decrease (in absolute value) except for the one representing the shielding effect. The impacts are calculated as 51% for the first PTA and 29% with the dilution effect, and 0.1% for trade diversion and 0.2% with the shielding effect. In column (3) we see that the results with Heckman correction are very similar to those from column (1). These findings support the argument of Helpman et al. (2008) that accounting for firm heterogeneity reduces biases while accounting for sample selection does not.
Estimation results
When we incorporate CPFEs without accounting for time varying unobserved heterogeneity, however, the estimated coefficients become very similar to one another as shown in columns 18 As shown in Helpman et al. (2008) , instead of adding Φ −1 (Î M R i j ,t ), we can add the regulation costs as a proxy for the fixed costs of exporting to control for firm heterogeneity. However, using the regulation costs data which is available from Djankov et al. (2002) causes a substantial drop-off in the number of obeservations. SeeHelpman et al. (2008) for more details. 19 Since religion is only available for two periods, we provide the results from waterways.
(4), (5) and (6). This implies that CPFEs correct for the majority of biases due to sample selection and firm heterogeneity. 20 Both the trade creation and dilution effects are reduced, with about 40 to 50 % increase in intra-bloc trade for the first PTA, and around 22 to 28 % rise on average after incorporating the dilution effect. The impact on extra-bloc trade for the first PTA is estimated to 1.6 % in columns (4) and (5) and 1.3% in columns (6), and such impact declines to 1.4% and 1.1% respectively due to the shielding effect. Estimations with both CPFEs and CTFEs again produce similar coefficients across columns (7), (8) and (9). The impact of the first PTA in columns (7), (8) and (9) is estimated to be 34%, 43%, and 43% respectively, and after taking into account the dilution effect, a PTA increases trade flows between members by 16%, 22% and 21% respectively. On the other hand, trade flows between a member and a non-member is expected to fall by about 1% for the first PTA, and the shielding effect 'save' about0.1% to0.3% of extra-bloc trade flows that would have been diverted. 
Conditional-Pseudo-Poisson-Maximum-Likelihood (CPPML) Estimation
So far our conclusions are drawn from the log-linear models where the dependent variables are either l n(T i j t + 1) or l n(T i j t ). However, in the presence of heteroskedastic errors, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that log-linear model leads to severely biased estimates for the marginal effect of PTA. In this section we extend Heckman (1979) 's two-stage estimation with CPFEs and CTFEs to a CPPML estimator using (19) in the second stage. Our proposed CPPML estimator, together with CPFEs, CTFEs and firm heterogeneity correction terms, can avoid bias from heteroskedastic errors.
The model
The gravity model provides the following conditional expectation for trade flows:
where it is assumed that E ( i j t |W i ) = 1 and W i includes all covariates on the right hand side of (19) .
The Poisson regression model that accounts forunobserved heterogeneity with an additional regressor is provided in Greene (1994 Greene ( , 1995 .
where the firm heterogeneity correction term, Φ −1 (P R) is obtained from the probit model (17) and the CRE approach with the assumptions of E (a i t |W i ) = 1 and E (b j t |W i ) = 1. However, the PPML estimator for (20) does not control for CPFEs which are crucial to correct bias in the estimation of the PTA effects. As we use conditional poisson regresssion model control for CPFEs, our estimation is as follow:
21 As implied by the results in Helpman et al. (2008) and our own estimation results in section 4.2, once we control for both CPFEs and CTFEs, additional control of self-selection of trade by Heckman's IMR does not further eliminate bias for PTA effect estimates. Thus, we do not control for self-selection in the estimation of Poisson regression models.
. This entails us to eliminate ω i j in (19) by conditioning on t =1 T i j t , using the result in Hausman et al. (1984) . Once we condition the log-likelihood function of (19) on t =1 T i j t and, given that the error structure of CTFEsis such that E (a i t + b j t + i j t |W i ) = 1 based on the CRE approach and the conditional expectation of (19) is correct, the CPPML estimator of (21) is consistent. The CPPML estimator with firm heterogeneity correction is also consistent since it only requires conditional expectation to be correct but not second moments (Gourieroux et al. (1984) ).
Estimation results
Table 5 and Figure 5 provide the CPPML estimation results.
22 When neither CPFEs nor CTFEs are used (i.e., the CPPML estimator is the PPML estimator), as shown in column (1), intra-bloc trade is estimated to increase by 148% due to the first PTA and 133% after incorporating the dilution effect. Compared to the 328% increase with the log-linear model, the PPML estimation of the first PTA effect is much smaller (148%), implying severe bias in the log-linear model due to heteroskedastic errors. As reported in Silva and Tenreyro (2006) , the coefficient of PTA shrinks in Poisson regressions compared to log-linear model regressions. In column (2), CPFEs are addded using the CPPML method. The increases in trade flows between members declines to 22% with the initial PTA, and 19% with the dilution effect. This confirms that it is crucial to apply the CPPML estimator, instead of the PPML one. Column (3) shows the result when both CPFEs and CTFEs are controlled for. The coefficient of PTA is slightly smaller than that in column (2). It shows that intra-bloc trade flows increase by 20% with the first PTA and 11% after incorporating the dilution effect. In columns (4) and (5), we further control for firm heterogeneity. The first PTA increases the intra-bloc trade by 39% with no CTFEs and 29% with CTFEs, and the trade creation effect after incorporating the dilution effect is 27% and 14% respectively. However, although the point estimates become larger after controlling for firm heterogeneity, once we take into account the standard errors, the estimates in columns (4) and (5) are not much different from those in columns (2) and (3) respectively. Now we turn to the trade diversion and shielding effects. As shown in column (1), if we control for the time FEs only, trade flows between a member and a non-member are estimated to decrease by 0.7% in case of the first PTA, and 0.6% after incorporating the shielding effect. When we add CPFEs in column (2), extra-bloc trade is to increase by 0.1% in case of the first PTA but the coefficient is statistically insignificant, and 0.15% with the shielding effect. As we further add CTFEs in column (3), it increases by 0.5% with the first PTA but the coefficient is still statistically insignificant, and 0.6% with the shielding effect. Accounting for firm heterogeneity does not change the qualitative results. The trade diversion term is still positive and statistically insignificant, and the net trade diversion effect after incorporating the shielding effect is slightly larger with CTFEs and the coefficent becomes statistically more significant in relative terms.
In summary, the CPPML estimation confirms the results of log-linear model estimation in that the dilution and shielding effects are statistically and economically significant, but it finds that the trade diversion is neither statistically nor economically significant. Size-wise the dilu- tion effect is about a half of the trade creation effect when we control for both CPFEs and CTFEs. Additionally accounting for firm heterogeneity has little influence on the results. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the cross effects of PTA on bilateral trade flows. We develop and quantify two such effects the (trade creation) dilution effect and the (trade diversion) shielding effect respectively. We base our empirical models on the gravity equation while accounting for various unobserved and omitted variables that could have caused estimation biases. We implement the log-linear model, Heckman (1979) 's two-stage and Helpman et al. (2008) 's firm heterogeneity correction procedures, and the CPPML method with CPFEs and CTFEs. . On top of controlling for CPFEs, we use two-year CTFEs or the CRE approach to circumvent the multicollinearity problem that derailed previous attempts in controlling for time varying unobserved heterogeneity when estimating both the trade creation and diversion effects simultaneously. All our estimations show that PTAs create more trade between members. In spite of the strong evidence that the trade creation effect is diluted substantially by pre-existing PTAs, the net PTA effect on bilateral trade betweenmembers remains significant statistically and economically. As for the trade flows between members and non-members, the estimated trade diversion effect is very small. The shielding effect, which is found to be statistically significant, mitigates the decrease in extra-bloc trade flows such that the net trade diversion effect is even smaller.
Latest theoretical studies attempt to explain the recent surge of PTAs based on the trade diversion and shielding effects, e.g., Egger and Larch (2008) and Baier et al. (2011) . They argue that one of the main incentives to seek for a PTA is to avoid trade diversion from other PTAs. Although our estimation results confirm the existence of the shielding effect, they cast doubt on their practical importance. While the positive intra-bloc trade effect of PTAs dominates the negative extra-bloc trade effect by far,both the trade diversion and shielding effects are very small in magnitude. Our results indicate that it is trade creation, not the mitigation of trade diversion, should be the major incentive in the formation of a PTA.
A Robustness check of the dilution and shielding effects
We replicate the estimations of Tables 3 and 4 with P T A i j t −1 and T D i j t −1 as additional regressors. The rationale is to avoid the interaction terms P T A i j t × T D i j t −1 and T D i j t × P T A i j t −1 in equation (16) from picking up the respectively individual effects of T D i j t −1 and P T A i j t −1 . Table 6 shows the estimation results of the dilution and shielding effects for the log-linear model. Table 7 shows the results after accounting for sample selection and firm heterogeneity. We can not replicate the Poisson estimation for Table 5 due to non-convergence problems with the CPPML estimation. As previously pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro (2010, 2011), this nonconvergence problems could happen when the Poisson model includes dummy variables, such as P T A i j t and P T A i j t −1 in our case. As it can be seen from the two tables, including those two additional regressors has little impact on the previous findings. Table 3 . Cluster (country pairs) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "A" includes ln(d i st ance i j t ), ln(Y i t ), ln(Y j t ), commom language , common colony , border contiguous, common legal origin and WTO pair-membership dummies. "B" includes ln(Y i t ), ln(Y j t ). "C" has no other extra control variable. CRE represents accounting for time varying unobserved heterogeneity by the CRE approach. 
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